In the Prophet Secretary problem, samples from a known set of probability distributions arrive one by one in a uniformly random order, and an algorithm must irrevocably pick one of the samples as soon as it arrives. The goal is to maximize the expected value of the sample picked relative to the expected maximum of the distributions. This is one of the most simple and fundamental problems in online decision making that models the process selling one item to a sequence of costumers. For a closely related problem called the Prophet Inequality where the order of the random variables is adversarial, it is known that one can achieve in expectation 1/2 of the expected maximum, and no better ratio is possible. For the Prophet Secretary problem, that is, when the variables arrive in a random order, Esfandiari et al. (2015) showed that one can actually get 1 − 1/e of the maximum. The 1 − 1/e bound was recently extended to more general settings by Ehsani et al. (2018) . Given these results, one might be tempted to believe that 1 − 1/e is the correct bound. We show that this is not the case by providing an algorithm for the Prophet Secretary problem that beats the 1 − 1/e bound and achieves 1 − 1/e + 1/400 times the expected maximum. We also prove a hardness result on the performance of algorithms under a natural restriction which we call deterministic distribution-insensitivity.
item is to be sold irrevocably to one of the customers. Suppose that the probability distribution of the valuation of each customer is known in advance. A threshold algorithm naturally translates to a posted price mechanism, which is inherently truthful, and the goal of maximizing the sample picked translates to maximizing the social welfare.
Indeed, if the algorithm knew all the samples X 1 , . . . , X n in advance, it would pick max i X i , resulting in an expected profit of E[max i X i ]. The algorithm's performance is, therefore, compared against the benchmark of E[max i X i ]. An algorithm is said to have a competitive ratio of c if its expected profit is at least c · E[max i X i ], on any sequence D 1 , . . . , D n of distributions, where X i ∼ D i . The classical results of Krengel and Sucheston [13, 14] and Samuel-Cahn [17] state that (1/2)-competitive algorithms exist, and no algorithm can have a better competitive ratio. One such (1/2)-competitive algorithm is the following simple algorithm by Kleinberg and Weinberg [12] : compute T = E[max i X i ]/2, and pick the first X i which exceeds T , if one exists.
Another well known problem in the domain of optimal stopping is the Secretary problem [6, 9] , where a set of values {x 1 , . . . x n } is chosen adversarially, and revealed to an algorithm in a random order. As before, an algorithm has to pick one of the x i 's as soon as it is revealed. Inspired from this problem, Esfandiari, Hajiaghayi, Liaghat, and Monemizadeh [8] defined a natural variant of the Prophet Inequality problem called the Prophet Secretary problem. In the Prophet Secretary problem, the set {D 1 , . . . , D n } of probability distributions is adversarial and known to the algorithm in advance, while the samples {X i ∼ D i } are revealed in a uniformly random order. Naturally, the Prophet Secretary problem models selling a single item to a randomly permuted set of customers, the distributions of whose valuations are known in advance.
Since the arrival order is no longer adversarial in the Prophet Secretary problem, it is natural to expect that algorithms with competitive ratio larger than 1/2 will exist. Esfandiari et al. gave an algorithm which does the following. The algorithm chooses a sequence 1 > α 1 > · · · > α n > 0 of thresholds determined completely by n and independent of the set of distributions. Suppose σ ∈ S n is the random order in which the samples are revealed, that is, the k th sample to be revealed is X σ (k ) . Then the algorithm picks X σ (k ) for the smallest k such that X σ (k ) ≥ α k · E[max i X i ], if such an index k exists, otherwise it picks nothing. Esfandiari et al. proved that, for a suitable choice of thresholds α 1 , . . . , α n , the algorithm is (1 − 1/e)-competitive. This was believed to be the optimal competitive ratio, and Ehsani et al. [7] mention improving this bound as a challenging problem.
As an impossibility result, Esfandiari et al. [8] also proved that no algorithm for the prophet secretary problem can have a competitive ratio better than 3/4. However, observe that the competitive ratio in the particular case where X 1 , . . . , X n are identically distributed and independent is trivially an upper bound on the competitive ratio of the Prophet Secretary problem. Moreover, if X 1 , . . . , X n are identically distributed, then the Prophet Inequality and the Prophet Secretary problems are equivalent. Hill and Kertz [11] had already proved that the competitive ratio for IID Prophet Inequality, which we call c iid , is at most (1.341) −1 ≈ 0.746. No upper bound better than c iid is known for the Prophet Secretary problem.
Our results
Our main result is that the (algorithmic) lower bound of 1 − 1/e on the competitive ratio of Prophet Secretary by Esfandiari et al. [8] is not tight. By introducing new techniques in addition to those of Esfandiari et al., we give an algorithm for the Prophet Secretary problem that has a competitive ratio better than 1 − 1/e. (It is noteworthy that, in contrast to Abolhassani et al. [1] who beat the 1 − 1/e bound provided there are enough copies of each distinct random variable, we beat the bound unconditionally.)
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Observe that the algorithm for the Prophet Inequality problem by [12] as well as the algorithm for the Prophet Secretary problem by [8] , which we stated previously, are both simple in the following sense. Both algorithms are actually oblivious to the probability distributions D 1 , . . . , D n of X 1 , . . . , X n ; they only need to know E[max i X i ], which they compete against. Moreover, both algorithms choose their threshold(s) deterministically. We call such algorithms deterministic distribution-insensitive algorithms. Our second result is a hardness result for deterministic distribution-insensitive algorithms. This improves the upper bound of 3/4 by [8] , as well as the better upper bound of c iid ≈ 0.746 due to [11] , for deterministic distribution-insensitive algorithms.
Our techniques
We give here the high-level ideas behind the design of our algorithm for the Prophet Secretary problem. Assume without loss of generality that E[max i X i ] = 1. Observe that for any a,
We divide the Prophet Secretary instances into three categories as follows. Loosely speaking, the first category contains instances in which E[min(a, max i X i )] is small, for a suitable a ≈ 1 − 1/e. The second category contains instances in which, in expectation, more than one X i exceed a certain threshold T . For each of these categories, we strengthen Esfandiari et al. 's algorithm to achieve a better performance.
The third category is most interesting and includes all the remaining instances. For these instances we prove that one of the X i 's (say X 1 ) is larger than all the rest with high probability, and also has a sufficiently large expectation. For these instances, our algorithm sets the same threshold for all samples. We prove that with high probability, the algorithm does not pick a sample before it encounters X 1 . As a consequence, it extracts most of the expected value of X 1 as its profit. Moreover, the algorithm encounters, on an average, half of the other X i 's before it sees X 1 , because the samples arrive in a uniformly random order. Thus, even in the unlikely event that one of the X i 's (i > 1) exceeds the threshold, the algorithm extracts its value with probability close to 1/2. (This is necessary because E[X 1 ], although large, is not guaranteed to be sufficient by itself for the algorithm to achieve its targeted competitive ratio.)
Related Work
Prophet Inequalities (worst case arrival order): Ever since the seminal work of Krengel and Sucheston [13, 14] , the Prophet Inequality problem has been studied in a variety of settings. One of the most natural variants is perhaps the multiple choice Prophet Inequality, where the algorithm is required to pick at most k of the x i 's (k > 1), and has to compete against the expectation of the sum of the k largest random variables. Alaei [2] gave an algorithm for this problem with competitive ratio 1 − O (k −1/2 ), which is known to be asymptotically optimal. Kleinberg and Weinberg [12] considered the Matroid Prophet Inequality problem, where the feasible subsets of random variables are independent sets of a given matroid. They gave a (1/2)-competitive algorithm even for this more general problem than the classical Prophet Inequality problem. Going beyond this, Prophet Inequalities where the feasibility constraint is an intersection of matroids [12] , or even an arbitrary downward-closed set system [15, 16] , have been studied. IID Prophet Inequalities: The case of identical distributions is particularly interesting because in this setting, the Prophet Inequality and the Prophet Secretary problems coincide. Already more Session 5b: Prophet Inequalities ACM EC'18, June 18-22, 2018, Ithaca, NY, USA.
than two decades ago, Hill and Kertz [11] gave an implicit characterization of c iid , the competitive ratio for identical distributions, by analyzing the natural dynamic programming algorithm which performs optimally on every instance. However, they could only find the numerical value of c iid (n), the competitive ratio when we have n independent identical random variables, for all n ≤ 10000. They conjectured that c iid (n) decreases as n increases, and proved that for n = 10000, the competitive ratio is approximately (1.341) −1 ≈ 0.746. For n > 10000, they could only prove a lower bound of 1 − 1/e on c iid (n). Only recently, Abolhassani et al. [1] improved the lower bound for large n to 0.738 by giving a new algorithm. Shortly thereafter, Correa, Foncea, Hoeksma, Oosterwijk, and Vredeveld [5] took an entirely new approach to the problem and came up with yet another algorithm. They proved that its competitive ratio is at least c cfhov > 0.745, a constant which they defined implicitly. [18] proved that the (1−1/e)-approximate revenue maximization algorithm of Chawla et al. [4] can be adapted to get a (1 − 1/e)-competitive algorithm for the best case arrival order variant of Prophet Inequality. Esfandiari et al. [8] proved that this bound holds even if the arrival order is random, as stated earlier, which suggests that the best case competitive ratio might be substantially better. Pursuing this line of research, Abolhassani et al. [1] proved that as long as there are sufficiently many (independent) copies of each random variable, an algorithm can come up with an appropriate order for which the competitive ratio is arbitrarily close to c iid . 1 In the absence of the multiplicity assumption, it is not known whether we can attain a competitive ratio for the best order case which is better than the random order case. Matroid Prophet Secretary: Very recently, Ehsani et al. [7] have considered the generalization of Prophet Secretary to matroids, analogous to Kleinberg and Weinberg's generalization of Prophet Inequality to matroids. Ehsani et al. give an algorithm that achieves the 1 − 1/e bound even with matroid feasibility constraint and random arrival order, and hence, can be seen as a generalization of the results of Yan [18] (matroid constraint, best case order) and Esfandiari et al. [8] (single choice constraint, random order). Posted price mechanism design: As remarked earlier, algorithms for problems like the Prophet Inequality and Prophet Secretary correspond to posted price mechanisms for approximately maximizing social welfare. A parallel line of work has been to design posted price mechanisms under similar settings for approximate revenue maximization, taking as benchmark the revenue obtained by Myerson's mechanism. For more information on posted price mechanisms for online arrival of buyers, see [2, 4, 5, 10, 18] , and the references therein.
Organization of the paper
Towards proving Theorem 1.1, we introduce some notation in Section 2. Since we reuse some part of Esfandiari et al.'s proof, we give an overview of that proof in Section 3. We present our algorithm in Section 4, and its analysis in the subsequent subsections, thereby proving Theorem 1.1. We devote Section 5 to prove Theorem 1.2, where we give an adversarial strategy to defeat every distribution-insensitive algorithm.
PRELIMINARIES
Let D 1 , . . . , D n be probability distributions on R + and let X 1 , . . . , X n be independent non-negative random variables, where
By scaling the random variables appropriately, we assume E[X ] = 1 without loss of generality throughout this paper.
In the Prophet Secretary problem, the following interaction takes place between an adversary ADV, an algorithm ALG, and a third player, say RAND, responsible for all the randomness. (We abuse notation and also denote the expected profit of the algorithm by ALG.)
(1) ADV declares a set {D 1 , . . . , D n } of probability distributions of independent random variables
RAND samples a permutation σ ∈ S n over the indices {1, . . . , n} uniformly at random and keeps it private.
the ALG is given the profit X σ (k ) and the loop breaks.
Note that in the above setting, we assume that the algorithm does not know σ , and it does not know X σ (k ) even after it rejects X σ (k ) .
In the more restricted setting of the Distribution-Insensitive Prophet Secretary problem, ADV, instead of making the distributions D 1 , . . . , D n public, sends them to RAND only. Thus, the algorithm only knows that E[max i X i ] is one. The thresholds α 1 , . . . , α n chosen by the algorithm are thus determined solely by n, and are oblivious to the distributions D 1 , . . . , D n . Moreover, if an algorithm chooses α 1 , . . . , α n deterministically, we call it a deterministic distribution-insensitive algorithm. The (1 − 1/e)-competitive algorithm of Esfandiari at al. [8] is a deterministic distributioninsensitive algorithm. In contrast, the algorithm that we design is sensitive to the distributions D 1 , . . . , D n .
OVERVIEW OF THE OLD ANALYSIS
We briefly restate those parts of the analysis by Esfandiari et al. [8] which we require in our proof. Let α 1 , . . . , α n be the thresholds chosen by an algorithm. Let the random variable z k denote the profit obtained by the algorithm from the k th round. That is, z k is equal to X σ (k ) if the algorithm picked X σ (k ) , the k th sample; otherwise z k is zero. Then
Observe that if we treat ALG as a posted price mechanism, then the first term in the last expression above is the expected revenue for the seller, whereas the second term is the expected utility of the buyer. The revenue and the utility components above are bounded from below as follows. Let θ (k ) denote the probability that the algorithm does not choose a value from the first k samples. Let α n+1 = 0. Then we have, Proposition 3.1 (Lemma 10 of [8] ). The expected revenue of ALG is given by
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n Pr[X ≥ x] for x ≥ α k , and the expected utility of ALG is bounded as
Substitution of these bounds into (1) results in a lower bound on ALG which depends on the θ (k )'s. Esfandiari et al. carefully choose the thresholds α 1 , . . . , α n in such a way that this dependence is eliminated, and α 1 ≈ 1 − 1/e is a lower bound on ALG, and hence, on the competitive ratio.
THE IMPROVED ALGORITHM
The main intuition behind our Prophet Secretary algorithm is the following. Suppose that the set {D 1 , . . . , D n } of probability distributions is such that for some a and c < 1, E[min(a, X )] ≤ c · a. Then we can use this to strengthen Proposition 3.2. Next, suppose that for some T , b, and d, the expected number of X i 's exceeding T is at least b, and
Then we also exploit this to strengthen Proposition 3.2. In either case, we improve the competitive ratio. However, there exist instances in which none of these improvements is possible. We prove that such instances must have one of the X i 's that is bounded away from zero with high probability, while the rest are close to zero with high probability. In this case, we prove that using a uniform threshold for all samples suffices.
Our improved algorithm for the Prophet Secretary problem has the following four parameters:
These are absolute constants independent of n and the distributions of the random variables, and their values will be fixed later. Let T be such that E[max(0,
, which trivially implies the following lower bound on T .
The thresholds α 1 , . . . , α n of the algorithm are determined as follows.
otherwise.
• Case 2:
· e (k −1)/n−1 otherwise.
• Case 3:
Our analyses of Case 1 and Case 2 reuse some parts of the analysis by Esfandiari et al. [8] , whereas the analysis of Case 3 uses a novel approach. We present the analyses of the three cases in the upcoming subsections, and then choose our parameters to get the final bound on the competitive ratio.
Analysis of Case 1
Suppose that the input set of distributions falls into Case 1, that is,
Using this upper bound on a 0 Pr[X ≥ x]dx, we get the following strengthened version of Proposition 3.2.
Proof. From the later part of Proposition 3.2, we have,
Then from the definition of α k in Case 1 of the algorithm, it is easy to verify that α k ≥ a. Thus, for any x ≥ 0, ax/α k ≤ x, and hence, Pr
Therefore,
where we get the first equality with the substitution y = ax/α k and the second last inequality follows from the assumption that we apply Case 1. Substituting this upper bound on
, and Proposition 3.2 for positions k such that (k − 1)/n > 1 + ln(1 − a), we get a stronger lower bound on 
The proof of this lemma is deferred to the full version of this paper [3] (Lemma 14 in the Appendix). Proof. Let τ be as defined in the statement of Lemma 4.2. We have
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Here we used Lemma 4.1 for the first term and Proposition 3.2 for the second term. Substituting this and the bound of Proposition 3.1 in Equation (1), we get
Using Lemma 4.2 and the fact that θ (k ) ≤ 1, we have,
Substituting the value of α 1 and using
Analysis of Case 2
Suppose that the input set of distributions falls into Case 2, that is,
can only increase as x decreases. This gives us the following strengthened version of Proposition 3.2.
Proof. Suppose
. From the definition of α k in Case 2 of the algorithm, it is clear that
Thus,
Here, in the first inequality, we used Equation (5) for the first term and the earlier part of Proposition 3.2 for the second term. In the second inequality, we used the lower bound (3) on T for the first term and the definition of T for the second term. , we get better bound on
Using this bound and Proposition 3.1, we again get a bound ALG which depends on the θ (k )'s. As before, our next lemma helps us prove that our 
The proof of this lemma is deferred to the full version of this paper [3] (Lemma 15 in the Appendix). n , for an absolute constant γ 2 .
Proof. Let τ be as defined in the statement of Lemma 4.5. We have
Here we used Proposition 3.2 for the first term and Lemma 4.4 for the second term. Substituting this and the bound of Proposition 3.1 in Equation (1), we get
Using Lemma 4.5 and the fact that θ (k ) ≤ 1, we have,
Substituting the value of α 1 and using γ 2 = γ < 2 + γ = 2 + γ > 2 , we have,
Analysis of Case 3
Suppose the set {X 1 , . . . , X n } of random variables falls into Case 3 of the algorithm. Then the algorithm chooses α 1 = · · · = α n = T , where
Consider the event that the algorithm does not pick any of the samples, and recall that its probability is θ (n), by definition. This event happens if and only if all the samples are less than T , or equivalently, the maximum of the samples is less than T . Our first lemma states that this event is not too likely. Lemma 4.7. Define h = ca−1+d a−1+d . Then the algorithm chooses some sample with probability at least h, that is, 
where we used the lower bound on T given by (3) for the second inequality. □ Next, we bound
dx from below. Substituting these lower bounds in Equation (1), we get a lower bound on the algorithm's profit. From Proposition 3.1 and recalling that α n+1 = 0, we have,
where we used Lemma 4.7 and Equation (3) for the last inequality.
Reusing some notation and arguments from Esfandiari et al. [8] , let q −i (k ) denote the probability that the algorithm rejects the first k samples, given that none of them came from X i . Then
Suppose x ≥ α k = T . Conditioned on σ (k ) = i, the event z k ≥ x happens if and only if the following two independent events happen: the algorithm rejects the first k − 1 samples, and
Interchanging the order of summations and integration, we get,
Pr[X i ≥ x]dx, the quantity in the second pair of parentheses above. Thus,
Define E i to be the event that the algorithm encounters X i , that is, it does not choose a sample before it sees X i . Then observe that Pr[E i |σ (k ) = i] = q −i (k − 1), and thus, Pr[
, the expression in the parentheses above. Therefore,
In order to lower bound the above, we need a crucial lemma, which states that there is one prominent random variable among {X 1 , . . . , X n } which is larger than T with a large probability, whereas the others are unlikely to exceed T . For the rest of this section, we assume, without loss of generality, that Pr[X 1 ≥ T ] = max i Pr[X i ≥ T ] (that is, the prominent random variable is X 1 ).
Lemma 4.8. Define д ∈ (0, 1] to be the unique 2 number such that
The proof of Lemma 4.8 relies on the following technical result. Lemma 4.9. Suppose y 1 , . . . , y n are such that 0 ≤ y i ≤ p for all i, and
Proof. Let (y 1 , . . . , y n ) minimize n i=1 (1 − y i ) subject to the constraints 0 ≤ y i ≤ p for all i, and n i=1 y i ≤ b. If np ≤ b, then it is easy to see that y 1 = . . . = y n = p is the optimum. Then
and n ≤ b/p. This implies the claim. Now suppose np > b. Then some y i must be less than p. Further, n i=1 y i must be equal to b, otherwise we can increase one of the y i s, resulting in a decrease in the objective value while maintaining feasibility. If we have 0 < y i ≤ y j < p for some i j, then we may choose an appropriate ε > 0 and replace (y i , y j ) by (y i − ε, y j + ε ), thereby decreasing n i=1 (1 − y i ) while still maintaining feasibility, and contradicting the optimality of (y 1 , . . . , y n ). Thus, we must have at most one y i which is in (0, p). This forces that ⌊b/p⌋ many y i s are p, one y i is b −p ⌊b/p⌋ = p(b/p − ⌊b/p⌋), and the rest are zero. Thus,
where we used the identity 1 − xz ≥ (1 − x ) z for x, z ∈ [0, 1] as long as 1 − x and z are not both zero. □ As a consequence, Lemma 4.8 is proved as follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.8. Suppose, for contradiction, that Pr[ 
This contradicts Lemma 4.7. Thus, Pr[X 1 ≥ T ] ≥ д, which also implies
□ Lemma 4.8 enables us to prove Lemma 4.10, which gives a lower bound on Pr[E i ]. Lemma 4.10 states that the prominent random variable X 1 is encountered with probability close to 1, whereas each of the others is encountered with probability almost 1/2. An intuitive explanation for this is the following. Lemma 4.8 states that X 2 , . . . , X n are together unlikely to cause the algorithm to stop. Therefore, the algorithm must see X 1 with probability close to one. Moreover, each X i (i > 1) appears before X 1 with probability 1/2. Given that this happens, the algorithm is unlikely to stop before it sees X i . Thus, X i is seen with probability close to 1/2. 2 Observe that ζ : (0, 1] −→ [0, 1/e ) defined as ζ (z ) = (1 − z ) 1/z is a monotonically decreasing function with ζ (1) = 0 and lim z→0 ζ (z ) = 1/e. We will ensure that 0 ≤ (1 − h) 1/b < 1/e, so that д exists.
\ i be the random subset of indices j whose position is before i in the random permutation σ . Then (8) where the inequality follows by the union bound.
First, consider the case of i = 1. By (8), we have,
Every j 1 is equally likely to be before 1 and after 1 in the random permutation. Thus, Pr[j ∈ S 1 ] = 1/2. Therefore,
where we used Lemma 4.8 for the second inequality. Next, let i > 1. Again, by (8), we have,
Given 1 S i , that is, 1 is after i, it is equally likely that j {1, i} is before i, between i and 1, and after 1, in the random permutation. Thus, Pr[j ∈ S i | 1
where we used Lemma 4.8 for the last inequality. Therefore,
Substituting the bounds given by Lemma 4.10 in Equation (7), we get,
We are thus left to bound µ 1 and
Proof. By the union bound, we have, 
On the other hand, using Lemma 4.8 and Equation (3), we also have,
Subtracting Equation 11 from Equation 10, we get,
The claim follows by observing that
where the inequality is due to union bound. As a result of the above analysis, we get the following bound on the competitive ratio.
Theorem 4.12. Suppose that the input set of distributions falls into Case 3 of the algorithm. Then the algorithm's expected profit is at least
Proof. Substituting Equation (6) and Equation (9) into Equation (1), and then using the bounds given by Equation (12) and Lemma 4.11, the claim follows. □
The Overall Competitive Ratio
We take a, c, d, and д as independent parameters, so that h = ca−1+d a−1+d , and because Proof. Let ALG(N ) denote the algorithm. The required algorithm ALG(n) behaves as follows. Given n random variables X 1 , . . . , X n , it adds N − n ghost random variables X n+1 , . . . , X N which take value zero deterministically. This does not change the expectation of the maximum. We now argue that ALG(n) can essentially simulate the behavior of ALG(N ). Given a permutation σ of [n], we can generate a permutation σ ′ of [N ] as follows. Arrange n + 1, . . . , N uniformly at random in N − n out of N locations, then place 1, . . . , n in the n vacant locations in the order specified by σ . If σ is a uniformly random permutation of [n], then σ ′ is a uniformly random permutation of [N ] . ALG(n) uses this trick as follows. First it places the ghost random variables into N − n out of N Session 5b: Prophet Inequalities ACM EC'18, June 18-22, 2018, Ithaca, NY, USA.
locations, and starts running ALG(N ). As soon as it encounters a vacant location, it asks for the next real input, and passes it on to ALG(N ). Clearly, since ALG(N ) is c-competitive, so is ALG(n). It is instructive to simplify the working of ALG(n). Given the sequence of thresholds α 1 , . . . , α N chosen by ALG(N ), ALG(n) essentially chooses a random subsequence of n thresholds and uses them. Clearly, since the algorithm is c-competitive on an average, there exists a subsequence of α 1 , . . . , α N with n thresholds which achieves c-competitiveness. □ Corollary 4.14. If there exists an algorithm with competitive ratio c − O (n −1 ) for the Prophet Secretary problem on n random variables, then for any ε > 0 there exists a (c −ε )-competitive algorithm for the Prophet Secretary problem.
Proof. Given an instance of the Prophet Secretary problem on n random variables, choose N large enough so that the O (N −1 ) term in the competitive ratio is less than ε, and apply Lemma 4.13.
□ As a consequence of the above corollary, we have an algorithm for the Prophet Secretary problem with competitive ratio c * − ε for every ε > 0. Since c * > 1 − 1/e + 1/400, Theorem 1.1 follows.
A HARDNESS RESULT FOR DISTRIBUTION-INSENSITIVE ALGORITHMS
Recall the definition of a deterministic distribution-insensitive algorithm from Section 2: such an algorithm chooses its thresholds α 1 , . . . , α n deterministically merely with the knowledge of the expected value of the maximum of the random variables, which we assumed to be one. Therefore, the adversary may adapt the input set of random variables to the algorithm subject to keeping the expectation of their maximum to be one. We now give an adversarial strategy which forces an upper bound of 11/15 on the competitive ratio of any deterministic distribution-insensitive algorithm ALG. This proves Theorem 1.2.
Let n = 3, and let α 1 , α 2 , α 3 be the thresholds chosen by a deterministic distribution-insensitive algorithm ALG. Without loss of generality, we assume α 3 = 0, because if the algorithm does not pick any of the first two samples, then it can only benefit by picking the last one, no matter how small it is. Depending on the values of α 1 and α 2 , the adversary chooses one of the following instances as input to the algorithm, where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant.
(1) X 1 is 1 deterministically; X 2 and X 3 are both 0 deterministically. (2) X 1 is 1 deterministically; X 2 and X 3 are both α 1 deterministically. (3) X 1 is (1 − (1 − ε)(α 1 − ε))/ε with probability ε and α 1 − ε with probability 1 − ε; X 2 and X 3 are both α 2 deterministically. (This instance is used only if α 1 > α 2 .) (4) X 1 is (1 − (1 − ε)(min(α 1 , α 2 ) − ε))/ε with probability ε and min(α 1 , α 2 ) − ε with probability 1 − ε; X 2 and X 3 are both 0 deterministically. (This instance is used only if min(α 1 , α 2 ) > 0.) Observe that for each of the instances above, E[max i X i ] = E[X 1 ] = 1. In order to prove an upper bound on the competitive ratio of ALG, we first consider the case where one of α 1 and α 2 is larger than 1, and analyze the algorithm's performance on Instance 1.
Lemma 5.1. If α 1 > 1 or α 2 > 1, then the competitive ratio of ALG is no larger than 2/3.
Proof. Consider the first instance, where X 1 is 1 deterministically, and X 2 and X 3 are both 0 deterministically. Suppose α 1 > 1. Then ALG misses X 1 with probability at least 1/3, so the expectation of its profit is at most 2/3. The same argument holds if α 2 > 1. □
We therefore assume for the rest of this section that both α 1 and α 2 are at most 1. In the next three lemmas, we analyze the algorithm's performance on Instances 2-4, each resulting in an upper bound on the algorithm's competitive ratio as a function of α 1 and α 2 . Then we argue that the minimum of the three bounds is at most 11/15 for any choice of α 1 and α 2 .
Lemma 5.2. The competitive ratio of ALG is no larger than (1 + 2α 1 )/3.
Proof. Consider the second instance, where X 1 is 1 deterministically, and X 2 and X 3 are both α 1 deterministically. ALG necessarily accepts the first sample, because all the random variables are at least α 1 with probability one. With probability 1/3, X 1 appears first and ALG's profit is 1, whereas with probability 2/3, one of X 2 and X 3 comes first, resulting in the ALG's profit being α 1 . Thus, the expectation of ALG's profit is (1 + 2α 1 )/3 . □ Lemma 5.3. If α 1 > α 2 , then the competitive ratio of ALG is no larger than (2 − α 1 + 2α 2 )/3.
Proof. Consider the third instance, where X 1 is (1 − (1 − ε )(α 1 − ε ))/ε with probability ε and α 1 − ε with probability 1 − ε, whereas both X 2 and X 3 are α 2 deterministically. Suppose X 1 appears first. If its value is realized to be (1 − (1 − ε)(α 1 − ε))/ε, then the algorithm picks it; otherwise the algorithm picks α 2 in the next round. Suppose X 1 appears second. Then the first sample, which is necessarily α 2 , is rejected, and since X 1 ≥ α 2 with probability one, the algorithm picks whatever value is realized for X 1 . If X 1 appears last, then the algorithm rejects the first sample, which is α 2 , and accepts the second one, which is also α 2 . Thus, the expected profit of the algorithm is
As ε → 0, this approaches (2 − α 1 + 2α 2 )/3. □ Lemma 5.4. If min(α 1 , α 2 ) = α > 0, then the competitive ratio of ALG is no larger than (3 − 2α )/3.
Proof. Consider the fourth instance, where X 1 is (1 − (1 − ε )(α − ε))/ε with probability ε and α − ε with probability 1 − ε, whereas both X 2 and X 3 are 0 deterministically. If X 1 appears first or second, then the algorithm picks it if and only if its realized value is (1 − (1 − ε )(α − ε ))/ε. If X 1 appears last, then the algorithm picks it irrespective of its realized value. Thus, the expected profit of the algorithm is .
Finally, if 0 = α 1 ≤ α 2 , then by Lemma 5.2, the competitive ratio of the algorithm is at most 1/3 < 11/15. □ Session 5b: Prophet Inequalities ACM EC'18, June 18-22, 2018, Ithaca, NY, USA.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our understanding of the Prophet Secretary problem is still limited, and there is a lot of scope for diving deeper. We showed that 1 − 1/e is not the correct competitive ratio for the Prophet Secretary problem. Under the natural restriction of deterministic distribution-insensitivity, we showed that no algorithm can have competitive ratio larger than 11/15. We conjecture that none of the bounds known bounds for the Prophet Secretary problem is tight. As this is a fundamental problem, finding the right competitive ratio is an important question which is still wide open.
